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The ‘‘We Card’’ Program: Tobacco Industry ‘‘Youth Smoking Prevention’’
as Industry Self-Preservation
Dorie E. Apollonio, PhD, MPP, and Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD
The ‘‘We Card’’ program is
the most ubiquitous tobacco
industry ‘‘youth smoking pre-
vention’’ program in the
United States, and its retailer
materials have been copied
in other countries. The pro-
gram’s effectiveness has been
questioned, but no previous
studies have examined its de-
velopment, goals, and uses
from the tobacco industry’s
perspective.
On the basis of our analysis
of tobacco industry docu-
ments released under the
1998 Master Settlement
Agreement, we concluded that
the We Card program was
undertaken for 2 primary pur-
poses: to improve the tobacco
industry’s image and to reduce
regulation and the enforce-
ment of existing laws. Policy-
makers should be cautious
about accepting industry self-
regulation at face value, both
because it redounds to the
industry’s benefit and be-
cause it is ineffective. (Am
J Public Health. 2010;100:
1188–1201. doi:10.2105/AJPH.
2009.169573)
THE ‘‘WE CARD’’ PROGRAM IS
the most widely used tobacco in-
dustry ‘‘youth smoking prevention’’
program in the United States. Its
logo (Figure 1) is visible on doors
and windows of gas stations and
convenience, grocery, and drug
stores throughout the country.1
Comparable programs have been
developed in other nations.2–4 Al-
though the tobacco industry explic-
itly marketed tobacco to youth as
late as the 1970s,5,6 today the in-
dustry says it agrees that tobacco
should not be marketed to the
legally underage7–11 and claims that
We Card successfully reduces sales
to youths.1,7,12 Evidence on the
effects of retailer ID checks,
however, is mixed,13–19 and a sys-
tematic review concluded that re-
tailer programs were the least ef-
fective intervention proposed to
reduce tobacco use among
youths.20 Tobacco control advo-
cates have debated whether youth
access programs are worth pursu-
ing, given that such programs’ ‘‘for-
bidden fruit’’ messages are attrac-
tive to adolescents,21–27 but no
previous studies have examined
We Card’s development, uses, and
goals.
Economic theory predicts that
industry self-regulation will
achieve social benefits far smaller
than those gained from govern-
ment regulation,28 although
governments increasingly view
self-regulation as a means to
achieve public goals without public
spending.29 However, industries
and governments may have com-
peting agendas, suggesting that
public health advocates should be
wary of self-regulation strategies.
We evaluated industry self-regula-
tion in the context of public health
by analyzing the development and
uses of We Card. This program’s
success in reaching tobacco retailers
and attracting independent allies
has made We Card one of the
tobacco industry’s major public re-
lations achievements. However, de-
spite industry claims that the pro-
gram is effective, internal industry
evidence suggests that We Card has
not reduced tobacco sales to mi-
nors and that it was not designed
to do so. Instead, We Card was
explicitly structured to improve
the industry’s public image and to
thwart regulation and law en-
forcement activity.
METHODS
More than 50 million internal
tobacco industry documents, re-
leased publicly as a result of the
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1998 Master Settlement Agree-
ment, are accessible online
through the University of Califor-
nia, San Francisco, Legacy To-
bacco Documents Library (http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu).30 Be-
tween September 2007 and De-
cember 2008, we used this online
resource to search for and review
documents detailing the creation of
a number of youth smoking pre-
vention programs. We began with
initial search terms including pro-
gram names (e.g., ‘‘We Card’’) and
used contextual information to
generate additional search terms,31
ultimately identifying and screening
more than 30 000 documents. We
analyzed internal tobacco industry
documents and secondary data
sources, including newspaper arti-
cles, advertising, and public state-
ments and research from state
public health departments. We
eliminated duplicate documents
and other materials irrelevant to
understanding the industry’s goals
and use of youth smoking pro-
grams. For example, we found
weekly updates on We Card and
annual summaries containing the
same information; in these cases,
we relied on the most complete
document.
We eventually decided to focus
solely on We Card. For this study,
we drew on approximately 200
documents related to We Card,
dated 1995 to 2006. Using
an interpretive approach, we iter-
atively reviewed documents to
identify recurring themes and
corporate positions. We also
reviewed the Web site created by
the Coalition for Responsible To-
bacco Retailing, and we examined
Web sites created by retail asso-
ciations that referenced the pro-
gram. We searched LexisNexis
and Google for contemporaneous
newspaper articles, and we used
print newspapers and tobacco
company Web sites to identify We
Card–related advertising. When
possible, we verified reports of
contacts with state public health
agencies, legislators, attorneys
general, and governors by check-
ing agency Web sites and research
reports. We assembled our find-
ings into a chronological case
study that described We Card’s
history, reviewed the program’s
publicity goals, and finally showed
how We Card was used to reduce
law enforcement activities and
undermine state tobacco control
programs.
RESULTS
We Card was created in 1995
to replace an existing youth
tobacco access prevention pro-
gram developed by the tobacco
industry, known as ‘‘Ask First—It’s
the Law.’’32 We Card was created
by the industry’s lobbying organi-
zation, the Tobacco Institute, with
the support of additional business
organizations33; however, the chief
executive of the newly created Co-
alition for Responsible Tobacco
Retailing (CRTR), which runs the
program, admitted internally that
virtually all of We Card’s funding
came from tobacco companies.34,35
During the first year, the Coalition
focused on generating positive
press coverage and developing
support for We Card by recruiting
state agencies to advocate for the
program.36,37 Early retailer ques-
tionnaires regarding awareness and
use of We Card focused primarily
on the endorsements and publicity
it had received.38 In addition,
CRTR sent films advertising the
program to law enforcement groups
and state associations that might be
enlisted as program affiliates.39
Materials displaying the We Card
logo were distributed free to re-
tailers, and CRTR supplied ‘‘tes-
timonials’’ about retailer success
with We Card (some dated from
before the program’s launch).40
In 1996, efforts to recruit affil-
iate groups and distribute free
materials ramped up,41 costing
$9.5 million.42 The Coalition sur-
veyed retailers about how they
Note. STAKE= Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement. We Card is a ‘‘youth smoking
prevention’’ program created by the Tobacco Institute, the US tobacco industry’s former
lobbying organization. STAKE is a California law that requires retailers to post a notice
including a telephone number to report to the state failures to check identification for
tobacco purchases.
FIGURE 1—Age-of-sale warning signs for (a) the We Card program
and (b) STAKE.
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used We Card both in stores and
for public relations.43 Results
suggested that retailers used We
Card materials as a defense when
caught selling cigarettes to minors,
arguing that any violations were
a one-time lapse from store pol-
icy.44 Yet a 1996 news article from
North Carolina noted that more
than a quarter of retail workers
failed to card minors, even after
being given We Card materials. In
addition, retailers who checked IDs
often sold tobacco to underage
teens even after seeing evidence
that they were minors.45–47
By 1997, Coalition publicity
efforts focused almost exclusively
on how widely they had distrib-
uted materials displaying the pro-
gram logo. Between 1995 and
1997, the tobacco industry spent
more than $20 million on We
Card,48 and the Coalition devel-
oped a standardized We Card kit
containing penny trays, calendars,
and window decals.49 Coalition
materials detailed the number of
kits distributed, ranging from 640
in Alaska to nearly 20 000 in
Florida (possibly in response to the
1997 introduction of Florida’s
‘‘truth’’ campaign),50–63 and listed
the numbers of retailer training
sessions conducted.64,65
Allies Come on Board
Efforts to recruit allies and
supporters were increasingly suc-
cessful (Table 1 and the box on
pages 1194–1195). By 1997, 3
state governors and 4 state attor-
neys general had expressed formal
support for We Card.68,69 We
Card coalitions, consisting primarily
of retailers, retail trade groups,
restaurants, alcohol industry
groups, and petroleum marketers,
TABLE 1—Government Organizations’ Involvement With We Card: United States, 1996–1999
State Organization(s)
Retailer
Recruitment
Endorsement/
Support
Joint
Training
Requested
Materials
Distributed
Materials
AK Attorney general’s office X X X
AK Department of Health and Human Services X X X
AK Local police departments X
AL Alcoholic Beverage Commission X X X X X
AL Attorney general (Bill Pryor) X X
AR Department of Health X
AR Governor (Mike Huckabee) X
AR Local police departments X
AR Tobacco Control Board X X
AZ Local health departments X
AZ Local police departments X
CA Local health departments X
CA Local police departments X
COa Department of Health X
COa Liquor Enforcement Division X X X
COa Local police departments X
CT Attorney general (Richard Blumenthal) X
CT Department of Mental Health and Addiction
Services Tobacco Compliance Unit
X
CT Local police departments X
FL Local police departments X
GA Department of Human Resources X X
GA Governor (Zell Miller) X
HI Department of Health X
IA Department of Health X X X
IA Governor (Terry Branstad) X
IA Local police departments X
ID Local police departments X
ID University of Idaho (state compliance study) X
IL Local health departments X X
IL Local police departments X
IN Local police departments X
KS Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control X X
KS Governor (Bill Graves) X X
KS Local health departments X
KS Local police departments X
KY Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (commissioner) X X
KY Department of Agriculture (commissioner, deputy) X
KY Governor (Paul Patton) X
KY Local health departments X
Continued
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were created in 21 states,64,70 and
the Junior Chamber of Commerce
agreed to distribute We Card
kits.71–74 CRTR used billboard
space donated by outdoor adver-
tising companies for public service
announcements to promote We
Card in 11 states.64,75–78 Press
coverage was extensive and favor-
able.66, 79–95 Coalition press re-
leases noted that law enforcement
agencies endorsed the program
and that police officers were dis-
tributing We Card materials to
retailers.96–98 We Card was
heavily promoted as a way to meet
the requirements of the Synar Reg-
ulation,99 which required states to
enforce laws prohibiting tobacco
sales to minors. The Tobacco In-
stitute reported that ‘‘the FDA
[Food and Drug Administration]
has come to We Card for help in
educating retailers.’’100
By 1998, CRTR had created
seminars targeting state public
health departments, and the coali-
tion claimed that 18 state agencies
supported We Card, some spe-
cifically as a means of achieving
Synar compliance.101 State public
health, tobacco control, and alcohol
control agencies; law enforcement
groups; and local police and health
departments recruited retailers for
training, promoted We Card,
attended training sessions, and dis-
tributed We Card materials, as
shown in Table 1.66,101,102 CRTR
also recruited additional elected
officials to support the program,
now totaling 9 governors and 5
attorneys general,69 and claimed to
have trained 24 000 retailers and
distributed 530 000 kits.103–106
Billboard public service announce-
ments expanded to nearly 1500
placements,107 coalitions supporting
TABLE 1—Continued
KY Local police departments X
KY Tobacco Enforcement Program (director) X X
LA Department of Public Health X
LA Local police departments X
MA Local health departments X
MA Local police departments X
MD Local health departments X
MD Local police departments X
ME Local police departments X
MI Department of Community Health (director) X X
MI Local health departments X
MI Local police departments X X X
MN Local health departments X
MN Local police departments X
MO Division of Liquor Control X
MO Governor (Mel Carnahan) X
MO Local health departments X
MO Local mayors X
MO Local police departments X
MO State Department of Health X X
MS Local police departments X X
MT Department of Health X
MT Governor (Marc Racicot) X
MT Local health departments X
MT Local police departments X
NC Alcohol Law Enforcement Division X X
NC Governor (James Hunt) X
NC Local health departments X
NC Local police departments X
NC Substance Abuse Services Administration X X X
ND Department of Health X X
ND Local health departments X
ND Local police departments X
NE Governor (Benjamin Nelson) X
NE Local health departments X
NE Local police departments X
NE State Patrol X X
NH Bureau of Substance Abuse Services X X
NH Local health departments X
NH Local police departments X
NJ Local health departments X
NJ Local police departments X
NM Department of Health X
Continued
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the program encompassed 40
states,48 and press releases an-
nounced celebrations of ‘‘We Card
day.’’108
Under the terms of the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement, the
Tobacco Institute was dissolved in
1999, and CRTR and the We Card
program were reconstituted by in-
dividual companies.35,109 As part of
this reorganization and in response
to Master Settlement Agreement
costs, We Card’s budget was cut to
$3.4 million,48,110,111 its newsletter
was cancelled, and efforts began to
enlist others to cover the program’s
costs.112 One idea was to pass the
program and its costs to the tobacco
control foundation newly created
by the Master Settlement Agree-
ment, which eventually was named
the American Legacy Founda-
tion.113 CRTR proposed to ‘‘Reach
out to non-traditional allies—offer
[the] American Legacy Foundation
[and] state training programs an
opportunity to participate.’’114 Ulti-
mately, it appears that the Ameri-
can Legacy Foundation was not
contacted and would not have
agreed to sponsor the program
(C. Healton, president and chief
executive officer, American Legacy
Foundation, personal communica-
tion, May 23, 2009), despite
CRTR’s goal to turn We Card into
‘‘a public-private ‘community’ train-
ing and education program.’’115
With its reduced budget, in
1999 CRTR aimed to ‘‘specify
various promotional programs and
efforts to include public official
participation’’ and ‘‘increase media
appeal,’’ including continued use of
public service announcements48,116
and other media.117,118 CRTR con-
tinued recruiting endorsements,119–122
but there were increasing demands
TABLE 1—Continued
NM Local police departments X
NV Attorney general (Frankie Del Pappa) X
NV Local police departments X
NV Nevada’s Health Service (Reno) X
NV State Health Department X
NY Attorney general (Dennis Vacco) X
NY Local health departments X X
NY Local police departments X
OH Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Services X
OH Local health departments X
OH Local police departments X
OH Governor (Bob Taft) X
OK Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement Commission (director) X
OK Governor (Frank Keating) X
OK Local police departments X
OR Local health departments X
OR Local police departments X
PA Department of Health X
PA Local health departments X
PA Local police departments X
RI Attorney general (Jeffrey Pine) X
RI Local police departments X
SC Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services X X
SC Governor (Jim Hodges) X
SC Local police departments X
SC Sumter Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse X
SD Attorney general (Mark Barnett) X X
SD Local police departments X
TN Department of Agriculture X X
TN Local health departments X
TN Local police departments X
TX Local health departments X
TX Local police departments X X
UT Local health departments X X
UT Local police departments X
VA Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control X X
VA Governor (James Gilmore) X X
VA Local mayors X
VA Local police departments X
WA Local police departments X
WI Local health departments X
WI Local police departments X
WV Local police departments X
Continued
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to show that the program was
actually effective. Although CRTR
claimed that ‘‘evidence of We
Card’s effectiveness has been
reported in 5 states,’’123,124 this
evidence was weak, consisting of 2
testimonials, 1 study of requests to
provide IDs with no sample size
disclosed, 1 survey of retailer
knowledge, and a comparison of
violations discovered between
1996 and 1997.125 As a result, the
Coalition noted a new program
goal: ‘‘document [an] incontrovert-
ible case that active participation in
We Card training and education
reduces underage tobacco sales at
the retail counter.’’48 However, the
metrics presented by CRTR con-
tinued to focus on the number of
training sessions, kits, billboards,
and endorsements, as well as the
extent of press coverage, and the
coalition touted the fact that 24
state agencies now promoted the
program.121,123,124,126–137 Tobacco
companies were advertising We
Card on corporate Web sites,138
and some retail chains mandated
its use in all stores.139 Despite
continued concerns regarding the
program’s effectiveness, CRTR
concluded that We Card training
provided ‘‘evidence that further
restrictions and taxes aren’t neces-
sary.’’42
Costs Shift to Retailers
The most notable change to We
Card in the 21st century was the
shift of many program costs to
retailers. However, questions
about effectiveness continued: in
2001, a newspaper columnist
reported that multiple stores dis-
playing We Card materials did not
card him when he attempted to
buy tobacco on his 18th birth-
day.140 Another article noted that
the majority of clerks who sold to
minors had asked for and received
IDs showing purchasers were un-
derage,141 a finding consistent with
research on the effectiveness of
compliance checks.47 Moreover,
a 2003 Philip Morris report cited
research showing that only 19% of
cigarettes obtained by youths were
from retail stores,142,143 undercut-
ting the rationale for the We Card
program. However, CRTR contin-
ued its publicity throughout 2000
to 2002, claiming the program was
stronger than existing laws in
2000,144 despite the fact that en-
forcement consisted of writing let-
ters to retailers—and, in the worst
case, imposing a short-term sus-
pension of promotional pro-
grams.145–149 Updates on alliances
continued.150–159 CRTR also devel-
oped materials in new languages
(Spanish, Korean), drew up
agreements with new companies to
support the program, and sent We
Card materials to congressional
hearings in an effort to prevent the
passage of new tobacco restric-
tions.160–162
In 2004, the shift of many We
Card materials’ costs to retailers
was complete.163–165 We Card
materials had been fully integrated
into brand promotions and adver-
tising displays to convey the mes-
sage of manufacturer responsibility,
and retailers could not participate in
incentive programs (industry pay-
ments to retailers for tobacco
promotions in stores) unless they
received training and purchased
and displayed multiple We Card
items.166–170 Partly as a result, pro-
gram advertisements in 2006 were
able to claim that ‘‘more than 82
000 retailers have been trained in
We Card seminars . . . about the
importance of selling tobacco
products only to those of legal
age.’’171 In 2009, CRTR advertised
that it had distributed more than 1
million kits and had secured sup-
port from state agencies in 25 of 50
states.1
Stated Aims Versus Actual
Activities
The history of the We Card
program reveals increasing
incongruity between the stated
aims of the program and its actual
activities. According to CRTR, ‘‘In
1995, a group of like-minded or-
ganizations got together to discuss
what they could accomplish as
a team to prevent the underage
sale of tobacco. The answer be-
came abundantly clear: training
and education.’’1 However, the co-
alition’s activities for more than
a decade focused primarily on
handing out materials, without any
effort to determine whether they
changed behavior; collecting en-
dorsements; publicizing We Card;
and praising the program’s spon-
sors.
This pattern reflects the to-
bacco industry’s concern with its
public image. One executive
noted, ‘‘In most cases, we [to-
bacco companies] don’t want
broad media coverage. The ‘gen-
eral’ press coverage of cigarettes
and cigarette manufacturers is
almost always negative.’’172
Both CRTR and the We Card
program were presented as quasi-
independent entities that hap-
pened to enjoy tobacco industry
support, rather than as the almost
wholly owned industry subsidiar-
ies they were. When CRTR’s di-
rector was asked to provide in-
formation on We Card funding to
a tobacco company government
relations representative, he
responded, ‘‘On the funding ques-
tion, we both know that the bulk of
the funding is provided by TI
[the Tobacco Institute]. That’s not
something that I advertise, nor
discuss with anyone outside of the
manufacturers and TI. The CRTR
board knows it . . . but I’m reluc-
tant to put that in writing for
distribution’’ [ellipsis in original].34
TABLE 1—Continued
WY Attorney general (Gay Woodhouse) X
WY Department of Health X X
WY Governor (Jim Geringer) X
WY Local police departments X
Note. We Card is a ‘‘youth smoking prevention’’ program created by the Tobacco Institute, the US tobacco industry’s lobbying organization. This
table is adapted from internal Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing documents.66,67
aColorado state law provides an affirmative defense to retailers who sell to minors if they have completed We Card training.
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Underlying Goals of Improving
Image and Reducing
Regulation
In internal documents passed
between CRTR and tobacco com-
panies, those involved with the
program were more specific about
We Card’s underlying goals, which
were 2-fold: first, to improve the
industry’s image through publicity,
and second, to reduce regulation
and law enforcement activity fo-
cused on tobacco control, particu-
larly stings of retail outlets that
revealed the extent of sales to
minors.
Improve tobacco’s image by
publicizing We Card. The chro-
nology of the We Card program
reveals CRTR’s heavy emphasis
on publicity and alliances. Pro-
motional materials proclaimed
that We Card was ‘‘a national
success.’’173 Discussion of what that
meant to the companies sponsoring
the program appears in reports
about advertising tests run by Philip
Morris in 2000, which compared
tobacco control advertising with
industry advertising campaigns, in-
cluding those that publicized We
Card:
The ‘‘We Card’’ commercials are
widely seen and an extremely
positive influence on attitudes
toward the tobacco industry
generally and PM specifically. . . .
Exposure to this ad greatly helps
in the sale of the responsible-
marketing-only-to-adults
message and reducing positive
response to the [American Leg-
acy Foundation ‘‘truth’’174,175] ads
vilifying the company.176
Focus group testing with the
general public, smokers, and opin-
ion leaders in 2003 demonstrated
We Card’s continuing success in
promoting the tobacco industry’s
image.177 Advertisements for We
Card were the most commonly
recalled tobacco industry promo-
tional materials, and reviews of the
program within Philip Morris ex-
plicitly stated that We Card was
a form of corporate advertising.178
Promotion of We Card improved
the company’s reputation,179 even
though research on youths at risk
for tobacco use suggested that they
perceived We Card advertisements
as encouragement to smoke upon
turning 18 (J. Moon-Howard, DrPH,
personal communication, June
2009). Over time, Philip Morris
proved unable to maintain positive
public perceptions of its corporate
responsibility program, but positive
perceptions of the company’s com-
mitment to youth smoking preven-
tion remained.180
Reduce tobacco regulation and
the enforcement of existing tobacco
control laws. The tobacco industry
and retailers anticipated from the
program’s inception that We Card
could be used to block stronger
policies restricting youth access to
tobacco. Industry surveys in 1996
found that retailers saw this as an
excellent use of the program.181
However, FDA regulators attempt-
ing to improve Synar compliance
noted that retailers had no serious
interest in using We Card to actu-
ally reduce tobacco sales to minors.
One complained: ‘‘As far as We
Card goes, there’s trouble with just
placing signs and nothing more.
Retailers think they’ve met their
responsibility as soon as they post
the signs.’’182 Similarly, Tobacco
Institute lobbyists viewed the pro-
gram as primarily political, noting in
a 1997 report: ‘‘Once again, work
by the WE CARD Coalition has
We Card Members and Participants:
United States, 1996–1999
Coalition members
American Wholesale Marketers Association
Food Marketing Institute
Lorillard Tobacco Company
NACS, the Association for Convenience and Petroleum
Retailing
National Grocers Association
Philip Morris USA
RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company
Supporting members
American Beverage Licensees
Beck Suppliers, Inc
BI-LO
Chevron Texaco
Commonwealth Brands, Inc
Conwood Company, LLC
Cumberland Farms
ExxonMobil
John Middleton
National Association of Chain Drug Stores
National Association of Police Organizations
National Association of Tobacco Outlets
National Black Police Association
National Korean American Grocers Association
National Retail Federation
NATSO, Inc
Penn National Gaming, Inc
Petroleum Marketers Association of American
Retail Industry Leaders Association
Service Station Dealers of America and Allied Trades
Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America
Team Schierl Companies
United Refining Company
US Smokeless Tobacco Company
Shared voluntary compliance agreements
BP West Coast Products
Chevron
ConocoPhillips
CVS
ExxonMobil
Kroger
Rite-Aid
Safeway
7-Eleven
Shell
Walgreens
Wal-Mart
On-site trainings (incomplete list)
Circle K
1194 | Government, Politics, and Law | Peer Reviewed | Apollonio and Malone American Journal of Public Health | July 2010, Vol 100, No. 7
GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND LAW
been instrumental in state efforts to
enact reasonable youth access
laws.’’100 As an example of ‘‘rea-
sonable’’ laws, the memo praised
state laws preempting stronger local
legislation.100
Efforts to use We Card to reduce
law enforcement activities were
more covert, initially detailed in
a confidential 1996 CRTR docu-
ment that surveyed We Card re-
tailers and made suggestions for
program users based on tactics
found effective for others.43 It
expressed strong concern about
auditing of retail outlets (meaning
stings wherein law enforcement
agencies sent minors to stores to
attempt tobacco purchases) and
suggested that promoting We Card
could reduce this practice. The re-
port suggested that the tobacco and
retail industry could use We Card
to ‘‘[sensitize] cops, who don’t al-
ways understand how difficult it is
for clerks to card customers.’’43 It
highlighted efforts to use We Card
to reduce law enforcement activity
indirectly by providing positive
publicity. As an example, the report
noted:
The [Quick Stop] company CEO
is very involved with city councils
and state legislators, and ‘‘always’’
presents the ‘‘We Card’’ program
whenever there is an opportu-
nity. [He] was not aware of any
tobacco ‘‘stings’’ on their stores
and believes the reason for this is
their involvement with public of-
ficials and agencies.43
The Coalition later successfully
solicited multiple police depart-
ments to participate in the ‘‘It’s
Our Duty’’ program, in which po-
lice officers distributed We Card
promotions to retailers.96–98,183
By 1999, CRTR had developed
enough positive publicity that it
could use its contacts to advocate
against tobacco control policies,
insulating tobacco companies
from the negative press coverage it
feared when it acted alone. In its
1999 training and education plan,
the coalition explained:
In short, We Card training efforts
helped gain the recognition of
hundreds of elected officials on
the local, state and federal levels
through hundreds of positive
news stories. Press reports citing
We Card appear in major dailies
(USA Today, LA Times), in many
local newspapers and on televi-
sion nationwide. State retail as-
sociation executives continue to
point to We Card training as
evidence that further restrictions
and taxes aren’t necessary.184
Soon, however, efforts to pro-
mote We Card as an alternative to
other regulation began to draw
negative attention. California had
passed the Stop Tobacco Access to
Kids Enforcement (STAKE) Act in
1995, which required that re-
tailers post a notice including
a telephone number to report to
the state failures to check identifi-
cation for tobacco purchases (Fig-
ure 1 shows a copy of the official
STAKE notice). In 2003, the Cal-
ifornia attorney general’s office
threatened litigation against CRTR
for encouraging retailers to violate
state law through its promotion
of We Card instead of STAKE
notices. The office’s first letter
explained:
The We Card materials appear
designed to be authoritative with
regard to the requirements of
California law concerning age of
sale warning signs. . . . [H]owever,
statements and information on
the Coalition’s website and in We
Card materials are incorrect, in-
complete, and misleading, and
likely encourage retailers to vio-
late state civil and criminal law.185
The issues raised by the attor-
ney general suggested larger
problems with We Card that
would continue to be an issue in
other states.185–188 These included
the revelation that We Card mate-
rials stated that facsimiles of official
identification were acceptable
proof of legal age for tobacco sales,
which the California attorney gen-
eral viewed as problematic: ‘‘Fac-
similes or reasonable likenesses of
IDs should be viewed by the Co-
alition and by retailers as being
inherently untrustworthy. Reliance
on such documents should not be
promoted in the Coalition’s website
and materials.’’187
Although CRTR changed its
materials to comply with Califor-
nia law, We Card has continued to
dominate the California retail en-
vironment. A state report noted,
‘‘More stores carried ‘We Card’
signs, distributed by the tobacco
industry, than the State mandated
Stop Tobacco Access to Kids En-
forcement (STAKE) Act signs.’’189
In 2008, only half of retailers
complied with the STAKE Act,
whereas three quarters displayed
We Card signs. Since 2001, use of
We Card materials by retailers has
dramatically exceeded use of
STAKE materials in every year
(Figure 2). Despite the efforts of
California agencies, We Card has
continued to undermine compli-
ance with state laws.
Cumberland Farms
CVS Pharmacy
Dairy Barn
Duane Reade
Flying J
Golden Gallon
Kmart
Kum-N-Go
Lucky Stores
Mobil
Motiva
Murphy Oil
Pak-A-Sak
Safeway
Shop Rite Food Stores
Sugar Creek Stores
Sunoco
Texaco
The Pantry Stores
TOPS Markets
Trimart
Wawa
Xtramart
Note. We Card is a ‘‘youth smoking prevention’’ program created by the Tobacco Institute,
the US tobacco industry’s lobbying organization. This table is adapted from the We Card Web
site1 and an internal Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing document.67
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DISCUSSION
Although We Card has been
presented as a way to decrease
tobacco sales to minors, we have
shown that the program’s goal is to
undermine enforcement of exist-
ing laws, prevent passage of effec-
tive state legislation, establish the
tobacco industry as a ‘‘partner’’
with state agencies,191 and burnish
the public images of tobacco
companies and retailers. Despite
extensive evidence suggesting that
current retailer efforts to reduce
tobacco sales to youths are inade-
quate,18,20 tobacco companies con-
tinue to claim that reductions in
smoking among youths are directly
attributable to We Card.12
Our study provides strong sup-
port for theoretical claims that
industry self-regulation fails to
achieve socially desirable out-
comes and may create socially
undesirable ones.28 The strategy of
creating alliances with public
health groups and law enforce-
ment agencies could be inter-
preted as additional evidence
that the strategies of Philip Mor-
ris’s Project Sunrise, a 20-year
plan aimed at rebuilding the
company’s image and dividing
the tobacco control community,
are still being executed. Those
plans explicitly referenced youth
access programs as fertile areas
for ‘‘partnerships’’ aimed at ‘‘cre-
ating schisms’’ within tobacco
control.191 Groups genuinely inter-
ested in decreasing access to to-
bacco among youths, therefore,
may wish to dissociate themselves
from We Card and similar industry-
sponsored programs, both in the
United States and internationally,
and consider legislation that pro-
hibits retailers from simultaneously
using industry and governmental
programs.192 In supporting We
Card, these groups may unwittingly
increase the tobacco industry’s
credibility193 while compromising
their own public health and law
enforcement goals. Furthermore,
article 5.3 of the Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control calls on
governments worldwide to avoid
partnering with the tobacco industry
in tobacco control programs.194
We Card and other similar in-
dustry programs are designed to
suggest that tobacco companies
are ‘‘part of the solution’’ to the
problem of youths’ tobacco use. In
doing so, they also serve to reify
‘‘youth tobacco use’’ as the prevail-
ing definition of the tobacco policy
problem, distracting the public and
policymakers from the fact that
cigarettes remain the single most
deadly consumer product ever
made. We Card continues the to-
bacco industry’s historical pattern
of public deception in the interest
of corporate self-preservation. j
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